The dynamics of entry and exit in turkish manufacturing industry by Secil Kaya & Yesim Üçdogruk
1
ERC Working Papers in Economics  02/02
September 2002









Middle East Technical University
Ankara 06531 Turkey
yesimu@metu.edu.tr
*This paper was presented at the ERC/METU International Conference in Economics VI, Ankara,
September 11-14, 2002.  The authors are grateful to Prof. Dr. Erol Taymaz for his helpful suggestions
and comments throughout the whole study.
Economic Research Center




Entry and exit are crucial elements of market selection process which leads to the
restructuring, adaptation and evolution of an industry. While the importance of entry and exit
has been recognised, attention has focused almost exclusively on quantifying barriers to them,
rather than on investigating the determinants of entry and exit and measuring the magnitude
of these processes. This paper analyses the entry and exit dynamics of Turkish manufacturing
industry defined at the 4-digit ISIC level for the period 1981-1997. While, on the one hand, it
focuses on the determinants of entry and exit and their sectoral variation, on the other hand, it
verifies the link between entry and exit. This paper employs a dynamic panel data estimation
procedure to investigate the relationship between entry and exit and to estimate the models of
entry and exit. Our empirical findings suggest that rates of entry and exit are determined by
profit margin, growth rate of output, concentration ratio, labor productivity, average wage
rate, advertisement intensity, capital intensity and wage and productivity differentials as
explanatory variables.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a long-standing interest in analyzing the determinants of entry and exit
processes and the relationship between them.  Both entry and exit are crucial elements of
market selection process which leads to the restructuring and evolution of industry.
Therefore, the process of entry and exit of firms and plants has long been held to play an
important role in the evolution and adaptation of industry to change. Entry and exit are
inherent parts of the dynamic competitive process that lead to some firms to grow and others
to decline. While the importance of entry and exit has been recognized, attention has focused
almost exclusively on quantifying barriers to them, rather than on investigating the
determinants of entry and exit and measuring them.
Entry and exit rates are the linked parts of an industry evolution process where large
numbers of new entrants may displace large numbers of older firms without changing totals.
That brings a difference between net and gross entry rates. However, these two rates do not
seem to follow highly diverging patterns if one looks at the empirical studies. There seems to
be a positive relationship between gross and net entry rates. On the other hand, entry and exit
seem to present significant amounts of sectoral variation, although this does not appear to
persist in the long-run (Fotopoulos and Spence, 1999: 1219).
According to the traditional view in industrial organization, a level of profitability in
excess of equilibrium induces entry into the industry. And this is why the entry of new firms
became interesting and important in the field of industrial organization- the new entrants
provided an equilibrating function in the market, in that levels of profitability and price are
restored to their long-run competitive levels (Audretsch and Mata, 1995: 414). However, the
survival and post-entry performance of new entrants are at least as important as the entry
process itself. Therefore, a body of literature oriented towards the dynamics of exit process
and the link between entry and exit.
This paper investigates the entry and exit dynamics of Turkish manufacturing industry
defined at the 4-digit ISIC level for the period 1981-1997. While, on the one hand, it focuses
on the determinants of entry and exit and their sectoral variation, on the other hand, it
examines the link between entry and exit. The outline of the paper is as follows: Section II
briefly summarizes the literature on the entry and exit dynamics and the main empirical4
studies on this field. Section III describes the data on Turkish manufacturing industry and the
methodology used in this study with a descriptive analysis. Section IV, includes the model
specification. In section V, estimation results are reported. Finally, section VI concludes.
II. LITERATURE SURVEY
There is a broad literature which analyzes the entry process and post-entry conditions
of firms. Empirical studies on this field, examined the growth and survival of new firms as
well as their entry process. Later, a literature that incorporates the exit process and
investigates the cumulative effect of both entry and exit developed.
The importance of actual patterns of firm entry and exit may be first recognized by a
study done by Dunne et al. in 1988. They constructed a new data set from the individual
plant-level data which is used to summarize the basic patterns of firm entry, growth and exit
in the four digit U.S manufacturing industries over the period 1963-1982. They examined the
relative importance of different types of entrants, the persistence of industry entry and exit
patterns over time, the correlation between industry entry and exit rates across industries and
over time, and the post-entry performance of entrants (Dunne et. al., 1988: 495). They found
that there is a significant variation in the entry, exit and size patterns of different categories of
entrants (Dunne et. al., 1988: 513). They also verified the heterogeneity in entry and exit
patterns across industries. Their findings suggested new areas of further research on
identifying industry specific characteristics that cause variation in entry and exit rates and also
in their determinants.
The publication of Market Dynamics and Entry by Paul Geroski (1991) and Entry and
Market Contestability, edited by Geroski and Joachim Schwalbach (1991), marked the
culmination of a wave of research in the field of industrial organization devoted towards
shedding light on the process of entry.  Ever since Joe Bain’s (1956) treatise, Barriers to New
Competition, research on the process of entry had been justified by economic welfare
concerns.  Entry became seen as one of the main mechanisms by which long-run equilibrium
levels of profitability and price are restored (Audretsch and Mata, 1995: 413).
Geroski (1995) points out seven stylized facts about entry, which are worth
highlighting. According to Geroski (1995), first of all, entry is common. Large number of
firms enters most markets in most years, but entry rates are far higher than market penetration5
rates. On the other hand, although there is a very large cross-section variation in entry,
differences in entry between industries do not persist for very long.  In fact, most of the total
variation in entry across industries and over time is ‘within’ industry variation rather than
‘between’ industry variation. Another fact that Geroski mentioned is that entry and exit rates
are highly positively correlated, and net entry rates are a modest fraction of gross entry rates.
Moreover, the survival rate of most entrants is low, and even successful entrants may take
more than a decade to achieve a size comparable to the average incumbent. De novo entry is
more common but less successful than entry by diversification. Entry rates vary over time,
coming in waves which often peak early in the life of many markets. Different waves tend to
contain different types of entrant. Lastly, costs of adjustment seem to penalize large-scale
initial entry and very rapid post-entry penetration rates (Geroski, 1995: 426).
Geroski (1995) also addressed eight stylized results which seem to have emerged from
the empirical literature on entry. Empirical studies show that entry seems to be slow to react
to high profits. Differences in profitability between industries are extremely stable and
persistent, meaning that most of the variation in profitability across industries and over time is
‘between’ industry variation.  Entry, on the other hand, varies much more over time and
differences in entry rates between industries are unstable and do not persist for very long.
This means entry exhibits far more ‘within’ industry variation than profits do (Geroski, 1995:
429).
Econometric estimates of the height of entry barriers suggest that they are high. Costs
of entry rise with advertising intensity, capital intensity, and minimum efficient scale, and
falls with industry size and industry growth. On the other hand, entry rates are hard to explain
using conventional measures of profitability and entry barriers. Entry seems to have only
modest effects on average industry price-cost margins.  Entry has traditionally been thought
of as an error-correction process, occurring when excess profits are high and causing them to
fall subsequently.  This view carries a fairly strong implication for the dynamics of market
performance, namely that profits are likely to be auto-correlated over time: high profits will
be bid down by entrants until they reach a long-run equilibrium level which depends, on the
height of entry barriers.  The short-run dynamics of profits are fairly smooth, and profits are
not equalized even across firms within the same industry in the long run.  Profit differences
are very stable over time within and between industries (Geroski, 1995: 430).6
Another result about entry implies that high rates of entry are often associated with
high rates of innovation and increases in efficiency. The response by incumbents to entry is
selective and prices are not usually used by incumbents to block entry (Geroski, 1995: 434).
Perhaps the most striking thing that we know about entry is that small-scale, de novo entry
seems to be relatively common in most industries, but that small-scale, de novo entrants
generally have a rather short life expectancy.  That is, entry appears to be relatively easy, but
survival is not.  Since entry is easy but survival is not, it is not difficult to believe that the
response by most incumbents to entry is likely to be rather selective (Geroski, 1995: 436).
Geroski (1995) states that entry can be episodic in character, playing an important role
in shaping industry structure in certain phases of the product life cycle and a more minor role
at other times.  Furthermore, the role that entry plays in shaping industry structure seems to be
bound up with the fact that entry is often used as a vehicle for introducing new innovations,
while the absence of entry is often associated with technological stagnation (Geroski, 1995:
436).
What all of this adds up to is a presumption that entry is generally a poor substitute for
active rivalry amongst incumbent firms in a market.  While it is common that entry can be an
important influence on the evolution of industry structure and performance, also, it is so only
selectively.  Further, entry seems to play an important role in stimulating industry evolution at
precisely those times when the current activities of incumbent firms are most out of line with
exogenous changes in costs and demand.  In short, not only is entry an imperfect mechanism
for getting prices right in markets, it is a mechanism for getting product and process
specifications right (Geroski, 1995: 437).
Virtually every empirical study examining entry behavior has considered the entry
either of all new firms in an industry (generally approximated by the changes in the numbers
of firms over a specific period or net entry) or else only of larger firms.  While the results of
these studies have not been unequivocal, certain tendencies have emerged.  Theoretical
models have predicted entry to be positively induced by high profits and growth and deterred
in the presence of structural barriers such as capital intensity and behavioral barriers such as
advertising intensity (Acs and Audretsch, 1989: 256).7
In fact, entry has been found to be positively related to growth in most studies.  Most
of these studies also found lagged profits to exert a positive influence on subsequent entry.
While Duetsch (1984) and Khemani and Shapiro (1987) found capital intensity to exert a
negative influence on the entry of firms of all sizes.  Similarly, Khemani and Shapiro (1987)
found advertising to be a significant barrier to entry of firms of all sizes.  While market
concentration is generally predicted to exert a negative influence on entry, most studies have
not substantiated this.  Similarly, the existence of a high technological opportunity class has
been hypothesized to induce entry.  Based on a number of empirical studies, it can reasonably
be concluded that the entry of all firm sizes appears to take place in rapidly growing industries
with relatively high price-cost margins and low advertising intensity, and where there is a
relatively high level of technological opportunity or R&D intensity (Acs and Audretsch, 1989:
257).
A study done by Baldwin and Gorecki (1991) investigates first the size of entry and
exit for a broad cross-section of industries, the different methods of entry and exit and lastly
some aspects of the dynamics of the entry and exit process by measuring both the
instantaneous and the cumulative rates of entry.  The contribution of this paper lies in the
construction of entry and exit measures and the associated data set that permit both the
instantaneous and the cumulative effects of entry and exit in the Canadian manufacturing
sector.  They revealed that the importance of entrants depended upon the probability of entry,
on the size of entrants, and on their growth rate after birth  (Baldwin and Gorecki, 1991: 320).
There has been increasing interest in understanding the determinants of entry and exit
of firms according to their size.  Adopting the view that ‘size matters’ in understanding entry
(exit) patterns, the aim of the study done by Fotopoulos and Spence (1998), is to discover the
determinants of net entry patterns of various size-defined groups of establishments in the case
of a less industrialized country-Greece.  The hypothesis to be tested is that proposed by Acs
and Audretsch (1989) that “determinants of entry are not independent of firm size”.  They
formulated the entry equation as a function of price cost margin, industry growth, product
differentiation, capital requirements and an index of relative efficiency (defines as the ratio of
size class specific value-added to employment ratio over the industry’s value-added to
employment ratio) (Fotopoulos and Spence, 1998: 136).8
Evidence is offered that small firms are different in that they manage to overcome
entry barriers, perhaps adopting different survival strategies, and that large firms are well
aware of market conditions and are in an advantageous position to overcome many of the
problems imposed by entry barriers.  Past industry profits do not have unequivocal effects on
small firms, entry barriers are hardly significant and when they become significant this
applies to small rather than larger entrants.  Industry growth, on the other hand, plays a
significant role in determining entry rates, but again it is not universally accepted whether this
role is more significant for smaller rather than larger firms (Fotopoulos and Spence, 1998:
127).
Another important aspect is that entry process involves trial and error.  Firms have to
develop basic skills before they can survive- and large numbers are appear not to have these
skills at birth.  Firms that fall by the wayside generally start off smaller, pay lower wages, and
have lower labor productivity. Nevertheless, a subset of new entrants survives and grows- and
the growth of this group is substantial.  The successful entrants that grow most are those that
develop one or other type of innovative activity- either with respect to the introduction of new
products, an emphasis on technology, or human resources.  It is in the area of innovation that
entrants make a widespread contribution (Baldwin and Johnson, 1999: 74).
What emerges from the studies of the entry process is that it is what happens to firms
subsequent to their entry that is at least as important as the entry process itself.  Understanding
the post-entry performance of firms is important because it sheds light on the selection
process of markets enabling some of the new entrants to survive and prosper, while others
stagnate and ultimately exit (Audretsch and Mata, 1995: 416).
The empirical literature on the determinants of the post-entry performance of new
plants has typically focused on the role played by structural factors, such as the degree of
market concentration, the height of entry barriers, the shape of average costs and the size of
entrants relative to the minimum efficient scale of production, as well as on the characteristics
and speed of technological progress in various industries.  Theoretical models of entry and
growth of the firm also suggest that, in addition to the age of firms, a proper specification of
exit and growth equations needs to include variables capturing the market structure, the
dynamism of various industries, and the technological regime (Boeri and Bellmann, 1995:
489).9
The study done by Wagner in 1999, contributes to the literature on exits by exploring a
rich longitudinal data set that was collected by annual personal interviews in some 1000
establishments from German manufacturing between 1994 and 1996.  He mentioned that as
one of the stylized facts that have emerged from the studies examining exit that the likelihood
of a firm exiting apparently declined with both age and size, suggesting that the bulk of firms
exiting from the industry tended to be new and small enterprises (Wagner, 1999: 259).
Turning to the role of innovation in shaping the risk of failure, he found that being a
product innovator was no way to insure against exit.  Labor productivity was lower in exits
than in surviving firms.  When he looked at profit situation, there was a link between the
profit situation and the propensity to exit, but it was not too strong.  Bad profits could be
tolerated for a while, especially if there was hope for change in the near future but good
profits today were by no means a guarantee for good profits in the future (Wagner, 1999:
260).
Recent theoretical models suggest that the order of exit determined by market forces is
not necessarily welfare optimal.  In these models, plant and firms size, and relative costs
influence exit from declining industries.  Firm characteristics should not matter in exit from a
competitive industry: plants earning lowest quasi-rents drop out until the remaining, most
efficient, plants are able to earn a normal return (Gibson and Harris, 1996: 522).
A number of studies have indicated that entry and exit are often highly positively
correlated, implying that underlying structural differences across industries produce similar
inter-industry patterns for both entry and exit.  The relationship is related to the question
whether or not entry and exit are positively related due to the possibility that the determinants
of entry function the same way as the determinants of exit (Fotopoulos and Spence: 1998,
245).
Conventional wisdom views entry as taking place when super-normal profits are
positive and exit when they are negative.  Logically this should mean that the relation
between entry and exit should be negative.  However, Dunne and Roberts (1991) find that
high profits attract both entry and exit and the same signs were found in Rosenbaum and10
Lamort (1992), although profits were not always significant in the exit formulations
(Fotopoulos and Spence: 1998, 246).
An early initiative to examine, empirically, the interdependence between entry and
exit, along with the testing of the symmetry hypothesis, was carried out by Shapiro and
Khemani (1987).  The entry and exit equations differ in the incentives used for exit where
industry growth and price cost margin measures were taken in phase with exit.  The result of
these formulations revealed considerable degrees of symmetry in the behavior of entry
barriers as determinants of both entry and exit (Fotopoulos and Spence: 1998, 248).
A somewhat different approach to the set up of the empirical entry and exit equation
was put forward by Rosenbaum and Lamort (1992).  Whereas the entry equation closely
follows the tradition established in the empirical literature, the exit equation is quite different.
Instead of putting the same barrier to entry variables used in the entry equation also in the exit
one, these authors used variables that are more closely related to the notion of sunk costs.  The
barriers to exit variables deployed were the advertising to sales ratio, assets liquidity, and the
primary product specialization ratio.  The entry and exit equations differ also in the usual
formulation of structural characteristics, such as profits and market growth.  The overall
conclusion was that markets that enjoy high entry rates have also high exit rates, but entry and
exit do not respond to each other (Fotopoulos and Spence: 1998, 249).
The empirical research accumulated so far pertaining to the possible interdependence
of entry and exit in manufacturing industries does not offer unequivocal evidence of the
processes involved.  Furthermore it seems to point to two different hypotheses about the high
positive correlation observed between entry and exit in manufacturing industries.  The first
assumes that entry and exit are part of system of equations where there is feedback
mechanism running from entry to exit and vice versa.  High levels of entry might lead to
displacement of existing firms by new entrants, and hence to exit.  But also high levels of exit
may create room for more entry to take place.  Thus, high levels of entry and exit might be
simultaneously determined.  The second hypothesis is that of natural churning, which is
higher industry turbulence due to underlying business conditions.  Entry and exit can be
highly positively correlated in time across industries but the ‘causality’ is not clear as the
concept of turbulence is broader than that of the displacement-vacuum effect (Fotopoulos and
Spence: 1998, 249).11
In order to determine the possible interdependence between entry and exit, Fotopoulos
and Spence made a study concerning the Greek manufacturing industries between 1982 and
1988.  They formulated the entry equation as a function of an industry’s price cost margin
(defined as annual value added from industrial activity minus payroll over sales, taken with
one year lag and expected to have a positive influence), minimum efficient size over industry
cost-disadvantage ratio as a proxy for economies of scale in industry (expected to have
negative influence), capital requirements (defined as the capital to labor ratio, expected to
have negative effect), product differentiation effort (defined as sum of advertising expenditure
over sales and expected effect is ambiguous), deflated industry sales used for industry size
and expected to have positive effect and lagged industry growth.  The exit equation was
formulated as a function of price cost margin (taken with zero lag and expected effect is
ambiguous), the measure of extent of small firm presence in an industry (expected to have
positive effect), industry growth (expected to have negative effect), capital requirements and a
proxy for product differentiation (Fotopoulos and Spence: 1998, 254).
The results of this research reveal that firm entry and exit are highly linked in the
Greek manufacturing industries between 1982 and 1988.  Symmetry appears to be
demonstrated and extended beyond traditional barriers to entry measures.  As in other studies,
entry and exit appear to be positively correlated with each other and with price cost margins.
This in turn indicates that turbulence might be characterizing more profitable industries in that
these offer both the attractions and also the impediments leading to both higher entry and exit.
Overall the conclusion to be drawn is that when both entry and exit equations are estimated
separately the results support that entry and exit are linked (industries that experience high
entry also experience high exit and entry and exit are both affected by the same structural
conditions), but when entry and exit are estimated within simultaneous equation framework,
the empirical evidence does not offer sufficient grounds to support the notion that entry and
exit are simultaneously linked.  Entry and exit seem to be two facets of the same coin and the
occurrence of symmetry might mask the real relationship (Fotopoulos and Spence: 1998,
261)( for a similar study see, e.g, Evans and Siegfried, 1992).
To sum up, empirical studies have examined several factors to explain the difference
between entry and exit rates across industries.  These factors consist of four categories (Carree
and Thurik, 1999: 2). The first category is the industry’s environmental characteristics that12
restrict entry and exit rates. These environmental characteristics consist of demand and cost
conditions. The second category is the stage of industry life cycle that consists of waves of
entry and exit. These waves are verified through the height of barriers namely, advertising
intensity, capital requirements and cost advantages of incumbents. The third category is the
strategic behavior of incumbents that is verified by concentration rate of the industries. The
last factor is the business cycle verified by profitability and growth rate. Entry and exit are
interrelated in that they are both affected by the factors aforementioned. Entry and exit may
however also be causally related: exit may cause entry and entry may cause exit (Carree and
Thurik, 1999:3).
III) ENTRY AND EXIT IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES: A DESCRIPTIVE
ANALYSIS
In this section, we will look at the Turkish manufacturing industries at the most
detailed level (ISIC 4-digit level) to determine industry characteristics that explain differences
in entry and exit rates.
The data source is the Censuses of Manufacturing Industry (1980, 1985 and 1992) and
the Annual Surveys of the Manufacturing Industry (all other years) conducted by the State
Institute of Statistics (SIS). The survey covers all public establishments, all private
establishments employing 10 or more people. The data consists of 77 industries in the period
1981-1997. Ten industries had to be omitted from the analysis because these industries consist
of less than two firms in certain years and because of some missing data.
When we look at the data, it shows huge deviations in survey years of 1985 and 1992.
In 1980, Turkish economy switched into a liberal outward-oriented development strategy
through the elimination of barriers to trade. We made a periodization for the post 1980 period.
The 1981-83 can be called as the adjustment period. Between 1984-89, Turkish economy
implemented trade liberalization that has far reaching effects on the manufacturing sector.
1989-93 period can be called as the financial liberalization period. In 1994, Turkey
experienced a severe economic crisis. So, it is meaningful to divide the post 1990 period into
two sub-periods, as pre-crisis period and post-crisis period.13
Table 1 presents data on the number of entrants and exitors in accordance with the
periodization at the four digit ISIC level.

















3111 6 36 22 23 0 10 11 19
3112 10 18 15 26 0 11 22 33
3113 21 43 43 57 12 39 38 41
3114 5500 0 1 2 3 0
3115 33 34 12 28 17 32 24 20
3116 49 92 55 51 26 107 71 59
3117 92 85 55 68 80 87 58 52
3118 01 0 0 0400 0
3119 10 14 17 19 12 13 10 7
3121 39 69 52 40 39 37 41 37
3122 28 42 28 29 4 17 53 25
3131 0000 0 0 0 0
3132 0000 0 0 0 0
3133 0000 0 0 0 0
3134 14 12 10 4 0 0 3 10
3140 12 7 3 3 0 6 14 0
3211 131 260 221 353 107 255 148 204
3212 19 39 41 126 0 23 18 53
3213 59 139 121 145 43 69 69 88
3214 22 10 24 32 26 26 14 14
3215 0000 0 0 0 0
3219 3007 0 0 0 0
3221 20 110 89 48 4 41 101 59
3222 128 587 536 634 53 268 337 489
3231 27 44 37 61 13 41 41 29
3233 31 0 8 0000 0
3240 13 26 33 48 9 13 21 22
3311 32 55 43 60 18 43 36 57
3319 0000 0 0 0 0
3320 31 47 52 74 25 45 36 35
3411 5344 0 4 0 3
3412 15 24 17 24 7 17 8 8
3419 11 7 0 0 6 8 0 3
3421 39 68 43 46 23 51 46 36
3511 7 17 0 0 6 14 11 3
3512 0000 0 0 6 0
3513 01 0 3 0040 0
3521 7 17 5 13 13 4 13 0
3522 96 1 33 8 8 7 0
3523 14 14 6 10 12 18 15 3
3529 10 19 18 21 0 17 11 10
3530 0080 0 0 5 0
3543 0000 0 0 0 0
3544 0003 3 0 0 0
3551 0000 0 0 0 0
3559 52 51 16 23 38 50 19 20
3560 108 119 89 128 82 94 66 67
3610 11 12 48 24 0 8 26 12
3620 15 6 12 28 12 7 7 4
3691 63 171 73 78 81 88 86 95
3692 62 26 42 00 9 3 8 1 7
3699 27 65 40 99 7 48 44 4814
3710 80 120 66 88 56 111 66 68
3720 40 53 46 34 29 42 47 15
3811 41 57 32 50 17 47 46 19
3812 23 11 32 28 11 13 23 4
3813 40 49 40 87 23 38 40 61
3819 95 100 82 89 65 99 66 42
3821 00 3 40 0 0 1 9 0
3822 26 14 3 22 16 14 11 14
3823 16 20 11 24 11 13 19 4
3824 34 49 22 65 20 43 24 26
3825 00 1 70 0 0 0 0
3829 70 95 52 85 35 77 45 48
3831 24 36 54 30 11 35 31 21
3832 12 32 26 23 4 27 28 18
3833 11 20 29 18 0 12 21 9
3839 40 48 13 58 32 49 18 24
3841 13 10 15 9 7 8 10 3
3842 0000 0 0 0 0
3843 90 86 100 94 55 89 52 40
3844 0005 0 0 0 0
3851 3 4 41 80807
3852 0030 0 0 0 0
3854 3333 0 0 0 3
3901 3063 0 0 0 0
3909 21 20 21 25 0 22 20 17
The number of entrants and exitors exhibits sectoral variations, however, these values
are relatively low in 1991 for most of the sectors.  This may be due to the real wage increases
observed in Turkish economy.  On the other hand, the number of entrants and exitors are
relatively high in spinning and weaving (3211), wearing apparel (3222), bakery products
(3117), motor vehicles (3843), fabricated metal products (3819) and plastic products sectors
(3560) (significantly textile industry) whereas, they exhibit relatively low patterns in basic
industrial chemicals (3511) and petroleum refineries (3530) sectors. This relatively high
number of entrants and exitors decrease in the 1990-1993 financial liberalization period. The
only increase that has been seen in the motor vehicles sector may be attributed to the after
financial liberalization period characteristic. High number of entrants and exitors observed in
plastic product, bakery products and spinning and weaving sectors can be explained by low
capital requirements in those industries. In the same way, high capital requirements deter
entry in relatively more capital-intensive industries (entry rate is zero for all years in
petroleum industry). The low or even zero entry rate in spirits sector (3131) can occur as a
result of high market concentration.
Graph 1 and Graph 2 present the number of entrants and exitors for the 1981-1997
period at the industry level. When we look at the data through industry specific variation,15
more than 50% of the entry and exit occurs in textile and engineering industries. Thus, the
trend of entry and exit dominantly determined by these sectors. Another industry that also
determines the pattern of entry and exit is food and tobacco industry. The number of entrants
increases in the adjustment period. In the trade liberalization period, entry follows a declining
pattern except textile industry in which the number of entrants displays an increase. Textile is
an export intensive industry and trade liberalization and export promotion which took place in
this period, explains the increase in entry in this sector. Between 1990-93, depending on the
demand expansion of the pre-crisis period and following the increase in real wages, the
number of entrants increased in all industries but this increase is smaller in magnitude than the
one seen in the trade liberalization period. Although the number of entrants declines in 1994,
it follows an increasing trend in the post-crisis period for most of the industries.
When we look at the number of exitors, there is a slight increase both in the
adjustment period and trade liberalization period for most of the industries. However, the
number of exitors increases significantly in textile industry for both periods. The data points
that textile industry is a highly dynamic sector in which entry and exit continuously occur. In
the 1990-1993 period, although the number of exitors falls significantly in most of the
industries, this slow down is the smallest in the food and tobacco and engineering industries.
Moreover, we see an increase in the number of entrants in textile and non-metallic mineral
products industries. In the post-crisis period, exit follows an decreasing trend in all of the
industries including the engineering and food and tobacco industries. The number of exitors
increases only in the textile industry for this period.
Table 2 undertakes cross-industry comparisons that suggest that there is wide variation
in entry and exit rates both within and across industries according to two digit ISIC level.

















31 0,120925 0,081729 0,080475 0,089322 0,073541 0,064928 0,08976 0,077772
32 0,148757 0,165317 0,163139 0,166247 0,089254 0,099325 0,110082 0,109536
33 0,148936 0,106695 0,132497 0,156909 0,101655 0,09205 0,100418 0,107728
34 0,133843 0,086587 0,075829 0,081949 0,068834 0,067912 0,063981 0,055371
35 0,144351 0,085329 0,079597 0,087467 0,112971 0,070489 0,077078 0,044822
36 0,106924 0,100693 0,112911 0,110667 0,087642 0,058373 0,09576 0,078222
37 0,159363 0,10029 0,103896 0,116746 0,112882 0,088696 0,104824 0,079426
38 0,169168 0,090365 0,115719 0,124102 0,095997 0,081528 0,091645 0,060123
39 0,1875 0,062696 0,121076 0,110236 0 0,068966 0,089686 0,06692916
The trend of entry and exit rates exhibits industrial variations, however, these rates are
relatively low in 1991 for most of the industries.  This may be due to the real wage increases
observed in Turkish economy.  On the other hand, entry and exit rates are relatively high in
textile, basic metal and engineering industries whereas, they exhibit relatively low patterns in
non-metallic mineral products industry. The entry and exit rates exhibit a higher pattern for
the textile industry through the whole period, whereas the high values of entry and exit rates
for basic metal and engineering industries starts to decrease with the 1984-1990 period and
keeps the same pattern afterwards.
IV. MODEL SPECIFICATION
In this study, the calculation of entrants, exitors and stayers is complicated by the
forward and backward looking nature of the calculation (Disney et. al., 1999: 4). Let us
consider an establishment observed in t. If it is present in t-1 but absent in t+1 it is an exitor.
Likewise, if it were absent in t-1 but present in t+1 it is an entrant. However, it is also
possible to be absent in t-1 and t+1, i.e. an entrant that exits after one year. This latter
category is thus both put in the calculation of entry as an entrant and in the calculation of exit
as an exitor.
The dependent variables to be estimated are the entry and exit rates. The determinants
of these variables are profit margin, concentration rate, growth rate, labor productivity, wage
and productivity differentials, average wage rate, advertisement intensity and capital intensity
which will be explained in this section. The data forms a balanced panel with 1233
observations. The data is deflated by the output deflator based on 1990.  Table 3 shows the
summary statistics of these variables and Table 4 presents the correlation matrix.
The first dependent variable that is to be explained is the entry rate: the proportion of
new entrants to total number of firms (that is entrants plus one year stayers divided by total
establishments). Entry can be specified as a function of profit margin (profmar), growth rate
(grate), concentration ratio (qherf), labor productivity (labpro), wage (wdif) and productivity
(prodif) differentials, average wage rate (awrate), advertisement intensity (advint) and capital
intensity (capint). The econometric model is as follows:17
Entry i,t  = αααα  profmar i,t + ββββ  grate i,t + δδδδ  qherf i,t + φφφφ  labpro i,t + γγγγ  wdif i,t + ηηηη  prodif i,t
                + θθθθ  awrate i,t + ρρρρ  advint i,t + λλλλ  capint i,t +  u i,t
Table 3. Summary Statistics
Variable   Obs      Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Year    1310   1989.002 4.899681 1981 1997
sic4    1310   3492.521 282.8596 3111 3909
Entry    1308   .0834814 .0909932 0 .5
Exit    1308   .0553904 .0652303 0 .5714286
Profmar  1310   .2726305 .1717308 -4.220935 .8168772
Advint   1310   .0068121 .0124192 0 .1209182
Awrate   1310   16431.97 10941.29 2690.792 93256.75
Capint   1310     8.63682 1.109972 5.054658 14.92668
Labpro   1310   11.02197 .8537609 8.765345 14.96629
Prodif   1310  -5.751534 1.14003              -8.941719 -2.587647
Wdif   1310  -6.178095 1.097088 -9.39514 -2.885532
Qherf   1310   .1350516 .1131362 .0046677 .6429099
Grate   1233   .1440214 .3803689 -.8916734 3.615346
Table 4. Correlation Matrix
             Entry     exit   profmar   advint   awrate   labpro   capint|   prodif     wdif    qherf    grate
Entry  1.0000
exit  0.3177    1.0000
Profmar-0.0685  -0.1101   1.0000
Advint   -0.0060  -0.0325   0.1204   1.0000
Awrate   -0.1213  -0.1021   0.1617   0.0443   1.0000
Labpro   -0.1300  -0.1496   0.3910   0.1235   0.7067   1.0000
Capint  -0.0510  -0.0277   0.1197   0.0764   0.5351   0.5714   1.0000
Prodif   -0.4288  -0.5074   0.1308   0.0403   0.1813   0.2016  -0.0557 1.0000
wdif   -0.3975  -0.4725   0.1072   0.0774   0.2328   0.1826   0.0341  0.9178   1.0000
Qherf   -0.3848  -0.4109   0.1076   0.0649   0.1444   0.2048  -0.0394 0.7505   0.7075   1.0000
Grate    0.1494   -0.0033   0.0430   0.0763   0.0443   0.0797   0.0378 0.0238   0.0333   0.1056   1.0000
Profit margin is the sectoral profit margin at time of entry. Profit margin is formulated
as the ratio of the difference between value added and payroll to the total sales. We defined
payroll as the sum of total payments (social security premiums, severance payments etc.)
made to wage earners. We used total output as a proxy for total sales due to the lack of data. It
is expected that the profitability of a sector determine its attractiveness for new firms to enter
into the industry (Ilmakunnas and Topi, 1999:285).18
Previous empirical studies do not indicate a significant relationship between entry rate
and profit margin.  Conventional view regards entry as an error-correction process, which acts
as an equilibrating mechanism in the market.  New firms are motivated to enter to the market
and cause excess profits to fall subsequently.  Therefore, entry and exit are expected to be
negatively correlated.  Conversely, data shows a positive relationship between entry and exit
(see Geroski, 1995).  Regarding this controversy, empirical studies explain the modest effect
of profit margin on entry rate. Although there is a strong theoretical argument explaining the
positive impact of the profit margin on the entry rate, empirical studies usually fail to find any
support for the hypothesis (Taymaz, 1997: 106).
Growth is the growth rate of sectoral output. It is calculated as one-year growth rate of
total output.  We expect that new firms will prefer to enter into rapidly growing industries.
Thus, the expected sign of the coefficient of the growth variable is positive. (Taymaz, 1997:
106  and Ilmakunnas and Topi, 1999:285).
The growth rate of an industry and its profitability reveal its attractiveness for
potential firms.  But entry is not a costless process: there are sunk costs and risks involved.
Entry barriers should be taken into consideration in the model of entry process.  Capital
intensity is closely related to entry costs, because if the industry uses capital-intensive
technology, the cost of the initial investment could be substantial.  If the investment is
indivisible and if capital markets are not perfect, the entry rate will be lower (Taymaz, 1997:
106). Therefore, capital intensity is included into the model as an explanatory variable. We
calculated capital intensity as the logarithm of the ratio of depreciation to the average number
of employees. Since it is difficult for new firms to enter to a highly capital intensive sector,
we expect negative relationship between entry and capital intensity.
The level of labor productivity is relatively high in industries where investment
requirements are indivisible and massive. This discourages potential firms from entering.
Moreover, the level of productivity may reflect the performance of existing firms.  Potential
firms avoid entering into those sectors in which existing firms are very productive because of
the risks of severe post-entry competition (Taymaz, 1997: 107). Therefore, we expect a
negative sign for the coefficient of labor productivity. Labor productivity is defined as the
logarithm of the ratio of value added to the average number of employees.19
The level of concentration is also important.  It is easier to enter perfectly competitive
industries in which many small firms produce standard products.  The Herfindahl index is
used to measure the level of concentration.  The Herfindahl index varies between 0 and 1 and
is equal to one for a monopolist market (Taymaz, 1997: 107). We used herfindahl index
which is calculated regarding the output to represent market concentration. We expect a
negative relationship between market structure and entry (Ilmakunnas and Topi, 1999:285).
The advertisement intensity is another source of entry barriers, because new firms need
to match the advertisements level of the incumbent firms to be known and tested by
consumers.  Therefore the cost of entry is increased by the advertisement intensity of existing
firms (Taymaz, 1997: 107). Here, advertisement intensity is calculated as the ratio of total
expenditures on advertisement to total output. We expect a negative relationship between
advertisement intensity and entry as it is a source of entry barrier (Ilmakunnas and Topi,
1999:285).
The average wage rate in an industry is expected to be negatively correlated to the
entry rate.  The average wage rate reflects the demand for industry-specific skills.  In high
wage industries, new firms will face problems in hiring the workers they need (Taymaz, 1997:
107). The average wage rate is defined as the ratio of the sum of total payments made to wage
earners to the average number of employees.
Finally, we use the wage rate differential and productivity differential variables to test
for the possibilities of creating niche markets.  The wage rate differential is defined as the
coefficient of variation of the wage rate in the industry.  It measures the intra-industry wage
disparity. Here, the wage rate differential is approximated with the logarithm of the ratio of
the standard deviation of total wage payments to the mean of total wage payments. The
productivity differential is defined in a similar way. It is formulated as the logarithm of the
ratio of the standard deviation of value added to the mean of value added. High values of
wage rate and productivity differential indicate the existence of a diverse set of establishments
in an industry in which new plants can establish a niche for their products (Taymaz, 1997:
107). The wage rate differential and productivity differential are expected to be positively
related with entry.20
Graph 3 presents the negative relationship between the entry and exit rates verified by
the data. Also we can see the positive relationship between the entry rate and profit margin
and growth rate and also the negative relationship between the entry rate and capital intensity
and concentration ratio in the following graphs.
The second dependent variable that is to be explained is the exit rate: the proportion of
exitors to total number of firms (that is exitors plus one year stayers divided by total
establishments). If the mobility of barriers hypothesis is correct, then the traditional
determinants of entry such as advertising intensity, capital intensity, profits, concentration rate
and industry growth are also determinants of exit (Doi, 1999: 332). In order to estimate the
exit equation, we used the same set of explanatory variables just by adding entry rate. The
econometric model is as follows:
Exit i,t  = αααα  profmar i,t + ββββ  grate  i,t + δδδδ  qherf  i,t + φφφφ  labpro  i,t + γγγγ  wdif  i,t + ηηηη  prodif i,t
+ θθθθ  awrate  i,t + ρρρρ  advint  i,t + λλλλ  capint  i,t + ΩΩΩΩ  entry i,t + u i,t
Empirical studies show a positive relationship between entry and exit rates. Therefore,
we expect a positive sign for the coefficient of entry variable in the exit equation. We expect a
negative relationship between exit and profit margin as losses stimulate the decision to exit
(Dio, 1999:333). Since capital intensity indicates sunk cots, the relationship between exit and
capital intensity is negative. The relationship between exit and growth rate is expected to be
negative as new firms prefer to stay in rapidly growing industries. Moreover, the life stage of
industry demand may exert influence on exit; lower demand growth may increase exit (Dio,
1999:333).  Lastly, the relationship between exit and concentration ratio is also expected to be
negative due to the fact that firms may be protected from competition if they exist in
concentrated industries (Dio, 1999:333).
Graph 8 presents the negative relationship between the exit rate and profit margin,
verified by the data. The negative relationship between exit rate and growth rate, capital
intensity and concentration ratio is presented in the following graphs.
We used Arellano-Bond GMM estimation technique in order to estimate our dynamic
panel data model. We introduced the lagged variables of entry and profit margin into the
model as we expect that entry is highly correlated with the past entry rates and profit margin.
As entry may influence the profit margin, concentration and the past entry rate, these21
variables seem to be endogenous in the model. Thus, due to such a two-way causality, we
may confront an endogeneity problem. In order to solve this problem, we used the
instrumental variables of profit margin, concentration rate, the growth rate and the past entry
rate. The same method is also applied to the estimation of exit equation.
VI. ESTIMATION RESULTS
We have estimated three models in order to verify the determinants of entry. Model1
consists of the first differences of all explanatory variables namely, growth rate, profit margin,
capital intensity, concentration ratio, labor productivity, productivity and wage differentials,
average wage rate. We have included lagged values of entry into the estimation in order to
capture the link between de novo entry and its past values. We used entry and profit margin as
GMM instruments to capture the endogenous link between entry and its determinants.
According to the estimation results of the first model, the coefficients of growth rate,
profit margin and productivity differential are positive as we expected and they are
significant. The relationship between the entry rate and capital intensity, concentration ratio,
lagged values of the entry rate and labor productivity are all negative and their coefficients are
significant.
Model 2 again consists of the first differences of all explanatory variables. But this
model also incorporates the lagged values of both entry and profit margin in order to capture
the link between entry and its barriers. We again used the same GMM instruments.
According to the estimation results, the coefficients of growth rate, profit margin and
productivity differential are positive as we expected and they are significant. The coefficients
of capital intensity, concentration ratio, labor productivity are all negative as expected and
they are all significant. The relationship between the entry rate and the lagged values of entry
and profit margin are both negative and their coefficients are significant. As we expected high
profit margin in the previous period deters the entry of existing period.
The last model again consists of the first differences of all explanatory variables. But
this model also incorporates the lagged values of growth rate in order to capture the link
between entry and its barriers. We again used the same GMM instruments.22
According to the estimation results, the coefficients of growth rate, profit margin and
productivity differential are positive as we expected and they are significant. The coefficients
of capital intensity, concentration ratio, labor productivity are all negative as expected and
they are all significant. The relationship between the entry rate and the lagged values of entry
and profit margin are both negative as we expected. Moreover, the coefficient of the lagged
values of growth rate is positive. High values of growth rate in the previous period leads to
high values of entry rate in the existing period.
The most meaningful model we have estimated in order to verify the determinants of
exit consists of the first differences of all explanatory variables including the entry rate. This
model incorporates the lagged values of entry rate in order to capture the link between the exit
and the entry. We used the growth rate and profit margin as GMM instruments to capture the
endogenous link between exit and its determinants.
Our estimation result for the determinants of exit rate goes in line with our
expectations. The coefficient of the growth rate, profit margin and concentration ratio are all
negative and significant. What comes out as a result beyond the expectations is the positive
relationship between the exit and the capital intensity. Our only reasoning for this positive
relationship can be that if an industry is highly capital intensive, the survival of entrants will
be difficult and they have to exit the sector. The relationship between exit and the lagged
values of entry is positive as the theory suggests.23
Table 2. Estimation Results
ENTRY EXIT
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL3 MODEL1
Coefficients Std. Error t-value Coefficients Std. Error t-value Coefficients Std. Error t-value Coefficients Std. Error t-value
Exit(-1) -0,195177 0,02033 9,6
Exit(-2) -0,11493 0,01581 7,27
Entry -0,0282733 0,0183 1,54
Entry(-1) -0,137808 0,02113 6,52 -0,144198 0,02331 6,19 -0,254575 0,02999 8,49 0,0433883 0,01931 2,25
Entry(-2) -0,124136 0,01167 10,6 -0,122835 0,01193 10,3 -0,200395 0,01524 13,2
Grate 0,0830658 0,006574 12,7 0,0838368 0,007313 11,5 0,1034 0,009223 11,2 -0,0050391 0,002611 1,93
Profmar 0,217892 0,03231 6,74 0,229262 0,0349 6,57 0,157809 0,02937 5,37 -0,18902 0,02901 6,52
Capint -0,0170469 0,004897 3,48 -0,0179566 0,004897 3,67 -0,0261986 0,005852 4,48 0,00705295 0,003084 2,29
Labpro -0,103424 0,01193 8,67 -0,105601 0,0121 8,73 -0,0836594 0,01352 6,19 0,0540004 0,01054 5,12
Advint 1,31209 0,2555 5,14 1,30684 0,2553 5,12 0,979678 0,2719 3,6 0,218345 0,1112 1,96
Qherf -0,213234 0,1077 1,98 -0,199909 0,1043 1,92 -0,273202 0,06708 4,07 -0,0490662 0,03056 1,61
Awrate 0,0010107 0,000353 2,86 0,00109442 0,000356 3,07 0,000342643 0,00031 1,11 0,00046081 0,000222 2,08
Prodif 0,00022707 0,000106 2,14 0,00021745 0,000105 2,07 0,00029225 7,48E-05 3,91 -0,0001755 8,59E-05 2,04
Wdif -0,0001174 0,0001 1,17 -0,00010692 0,0001 1,07 -0,000189086 7,14E-05 2,65 0,00013122 8,28E-05 1,59
Profmar(-1) -0,0277463 0,001959 14,2 -0,0322041 0,001561 20,6
Profmar(-2) -0,0203715 0,001852 11 -0,0221868 0,001381 16,1
Grate(-1) 0,04748 0,01144 4,15
Grate(-2) 0,036196 0,008706 4,16
Constant 0,00795394 0,000858 9,27 0,00818612 0,000886 9,24 0,00944327 0,001173 8,05 -0,0053359 0,000906 5,8924
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Entry and exit dynamics have been central to any study that analyses the structure of
industries.  The reason behind the importance given to entry and exit issues comes from the
fact that entry and exit dynamics have a significant impact on the characteristics of industries.
While, on the one hand, entry and exit are the actors of the mechanism that equilibrates the
excess profits in the market, on the other hand, they are the source for entrepreneurialship and
innovation process.  New firms should have some kind of entrepreneurialship in order to
sustain their survival and their survival probability rises with their innovative capacity.
Hence, these firms are also important for the innovation process of industries.
Any study on entry and exit issues should answer some crucial questions like why
firms enter, what determines their entry decisions and whether they manage to survive.  So, at
this point, the determinants of entry and exit deserve some attention.  Entry and exit rates
show sectoral variations and also differ over time.
In this study, we tried to investigate the main determinants of entry and exit and their
variations between industries and over time.  We used the data on Turkish manufacturing
industry for the period 1981-1997.  We took profit margin, capital intensity, concentration
ratio, growth rate, advertisement intensity, labor productivity, average wage rate, wage and
productivity differentials as the main determinants of entry.  Our findings report that entry
highly affected by profit margin, capital intensity, concentration ratio and growth rate.  We
used the same set of explanatory variables including entry in order to explain the determinants
of exit.  According to our results, entry, growth rate, capital intensity and concentration ratio
seem to be the main determinants of exit.
Studies that analyze the entry and exit behaviors for various countries could  not
support the expected relationship between entry and profit margin with the data.  Theory
predicts that profit margin positively affects entry rate while it has ambiguous influence on
exit rate.  This is reasonable because profit margin includes costs that can be thought as entry
barriers.  However, previous studies did not find a positive profit margin entry relationship.
On the other hand, according to our estimation results, there is a strong and positive
correlation between these two variables.  We also found a negative correlation between exit
and profit margin which is consistent with the theory.25
Capital intensity which represents an entry barrier in the model, seems to be negatively
and significantly related to the entry rate.  This is also consistent with the theory.  Moreover,
there is a positive correlation between exit rate and capital intensity.  One can infer that the
entry barriers in Turkish manufacturing industry are strong enough to inhibit entry.
The coefficient of growth rate, as expected, has a positive sign in entry equation.  This
positive sign implies that high growth rates in the industry attract new entrants.  On the other
hand, the relationship between exit and growth rate is strong and negative.
The concentration ratio is an important determinant of entry and exit as entry and exit
will be much harder in a concentrated industry.  The level of concentration variable is
negatively correlated with the entry rate, whereas, the sign of this coefficient is positive if the
exit rate is the dependent variable.  Our findings are consistent with the theory in the sense
that the level of concentration seems to have a strong explanatory power in both entry and exit
equations.  The entry rate also seems to be an important determinant of exit as there is a
strong and positive relationship between these two variables.
As some of our explanatory variables like profit margin and concentration ratio may
be endogenous in the model, we introduced the instrumental variables of them.  Estimation
results show that these instruments are also meaningful and there seems to exist no serious
autocorrelation.
As 1985 and 1992 were the years of special firm-by-firm surveys, the entry and exit
rates are more higher for these years.  On the other hand, entry rate seems to be lowest for
most industries in 1991.  The reason for this decline may be the increases in the real wage
rate.  Entry and exit rates are higher for textile and food and tobacco industries due to the low
capital requirements in these industries.  These rates even become zero in highly capital-
intensive industries like petroleum industry.  Entry and exit rates are also low in concentrated
industries like basic chemical industry.
To sum up, entry and exit rates in an industry is largely determined by the variables
that represent the concentration level, profitability, the capital requirements and the cost
structure and lastly the growth rate of the industry.  The characteristics of new firms and the26
determinants of their probability of survival are also important issues.  A further study with
firm level data can be done in order to analyze these related issues.
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Graph 11. Exit and Growth Rate Relationship (Grate >0.09)
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